Incentive Contracts
Mostrando 1-4 de 4 artigos, teses e dissertações.
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1. Identity in Family Firms: A Theoretical Analysis of Incentives and Contracts
Abstract We developed a principal-agent model that coherently and parsimoniously explains previous findings from research on executive compensation in family firms. We introduce organizational identification in the model in order to capture the effect of family firms' distinctive characteristics on the agent's behavior. After describing the optimal incentive
BAR, Braz. Adm. Rev.. Publicado em: 21/09/2017
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2. O uso do lucro econômico na formulação de contratos de incentivo contingentes ao desempenho e o problema do horizonte: uma análise experimental / The use of the economic profit in performance-contingent incentive contracts and the horizon problem: an experimetal analysis
The present study investigated whether the use of economic profit in performance-contingent incentive contracts motivates individuals to act more consistently with the long-term goals of the firm when the horizon problem is present. An experimental design was conducted. The experiment used a single factor between-subjects and pre-post treatment with a contro
IBICT - Instituto Brasileiro de Informação em Ciência e Tecnologia. Publicado em: 06/12/2012
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3. O processo e o (des)controle da expansão urbana de São Carlos (1857-1977) / The process and the (un)control of the urban expansion in São Carlos (1857-1977)
Urban expansion. This work consists in the study of São Carlos, SP urban expansion process, between 1857 and 1977 years, from the implanted land divisions into lots and from the urban expansion instruments of control and planning. It is analyzed the main changes and continuities of the national, state and municipal socioeconomic context; of land use and occ
Publicado em: 2007
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4. Optimal performance fee and flow of funds in asset management contracts
This paper investigates the importance of ow of funds as an implicit incentive in the asset management industry. We build a two-period bi- nomial moral hazard model to explain the trade-o¤s between ow, per- formance and fees where e¤ort depends on the combination of implicit ( ow of funds) and explicit (performance fee) incentives. Two cases are consider
Publicado em: 08/08/2005