Matéria, alma e identidade pessoal em Hume
AUTOR(ES)
Fábio Augusto Guzzo
FONTE
IBICT - Instituto Brasileiro de Informação em Ciência e Tecnologia
DATA DE PUBLICAÇÃO
2011
RESUMO
I defend, in this dissertation, a materialist interpretation of humean philosophy. This interpretation is based on some of the themes presented in Book 1 of the Treatise of Human Nature. The task is divided in three parts: in the first chapter, I examine two of the principles which ground the theory of ideas presented in Part 1, the principles of copy and of separability. Together, they imply the impotence of a priori reason in the factual domain. It is the imagination, a corporeal faculty, that assumes the leading role in humean epistemology; in the second chapter, I examine the section Of the immateriality of the soul (Part 4, Section 5), in which the substantial soul disappears and gives place to perceptions causally related to a body. Here, Hume¿s phisicalist conception about the cognitive phenomena is evidenced. I try to explain this conception by comparing it to Reid¿s conception, according to which cognitive phenomena is intrinsically imaterial and, therefore, without any causal relation to matter; the subject of the third chapter is the section ¿Of personal identity¿ (Part 4, Section 6), in which Hume states that the belief in this identity derives from associations of ideas. In the Appendix Hume recognizes the insufficiency of his early explanation. I expose some of the problems that may have engendered the doubts of the Appendix and defend that they don¿t amount to a possible abandonment of materialism, that is, of the ontological conception which has led to the thesis of the mind as a simple bundle of perceptions causally related.
ASSUNTO(S)
hume, david, 1711-1776 soul filosofia inglesa causality filosofia anglo-saxônica materialism materialismo perception personal identity causalidade (filosofia) alma identidade pessoal percepção
