Reciprocal Altruism
Mostrando 1-6 de 6 artigos, teses e dissertações.
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1. Análise qualitativa de riscos de projetos suportada pela teoria dos jogos / Project risk assessment supported by game theory
Since 1944, when it was published the first book by John Von Neumann about Game Theory, the application field is growing very fast year after year. At the begin the theory was widely used to predict Macroeconomics behavior but nowadays there are several studies in different areas as biology, sociology and computational engineering. John Maynard Smith in the
IBICT - Instituto Brasileiro de Informação em Ciência e Tecnologia. Publicado em: 14/12/2010
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2. Selección de grupo y altruismo: el origen del debate
One of the most debated issues in evolutionary biology concerns the level at which natural selection operates. It is usually accepted that Darwin maintained that natural selection operates at the individual level. However, another line of interpretation suggests that Darwin conceived that natural selection could operate at the group level as well, specifical
Scientiae Studia. Publicado em: 2009
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3. "O avunculado na Antropologia Evolutiva: uma abordagem intercultural" / "The avunculate in the evolutionary anthropology: a cross cultural survey"
The present work proposes to account for cultural variability in connection to human family organization, through Darwins theories of natural selection and sexual selection. It is also founded on evidence based on the comparison of ethnographic data of diverse human societies. It intends to demonstrate that there is a significant alteration in the behavior
Publicado em: 2007
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4. Altruism: Its characteristics and evolution
Altruism is a group phenomenon in which some genes or individuals, which must be presumed to be selfish, benefit others at cost to themselves. The presumption of selfishness and the fact of altruism are reconciled by kin-group selection and by reciprocal altruism. Kin-group selection is clearly visible only in special cases; its role even among social insect
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5. Competition among cooperators: Altruism and reciprocity
Levine argues that neither self-interest nor altruism explains experimental results in bargaining and public goods games. Subjects' preferences appear also to be sensitive to their opponents' perceived altruism. Sethi and Somanathan provide a general account of reciprocal preferences that survive under evolutionary pressure. Although a wide variety of recipr
National Academy of Sciences.
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6. A quantitative genetic model of reciprocal altruism: a condition for kin or group selection to prevail.
A condition is derived for reciprocal altruism to evolve by kin or group selection. It is assumed that many additively acting genes of small effect and the environment determine the probability that an individual is a reciprocal altruist, as opposed to being unconditionally selfish. The particular form of reciprocal altruism considered is TIT FOR TAT, a stra