Payoffs
Mostrando 13-24 de 27 artigos, teses e dissertações.
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13. A SEQUENTIAL MODEL OF ENDOGENOUS COLLATERAL / UM MODELO SEQUENCIAL DE COLATERAL ENDÓGENO
This paper develops and establishes the existence of equilibrium for a sequential model with two stages, incomplete financial markets, credit risk and endogenous collateral. In the first stage, by choosing the collateral, according to a predetermined and exogenously given rule, the agents issue personalized securities that will be traded in the second stage
Publicado em: 2004
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14. Structure theorems for game trees
Kohlberg and Mertens [Kohlberg, E. & Mertens, J. (1986) Econometrica 54, 1003–1039] proved that the graph of the Nash equilibrium correspondence is homeomorphic to its domain when the domain is the space of payoffs in normal-form games. A counterexample disproves the analog for the equilibrium outcome correspondence over the space of payoffs in extensive-f
National Academy of Sciences.
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15. Small Investments, Big Payoffs
BioCommunications LLC.
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16. CONVERGENCE IN THE MIDST OF COMPETITION
Biotechs are growing up and branching out, having learned that a narrow business focus makes for neither headlines nor payoffs.
BioCommunications LLC.
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17. Status-dependent selection in the dimorphic beetle Onthophagus taurus.
The occurrence of alternative reproductive phenotypes is widespread in most animal taxa. The majority of known examples best fit the notion of alternative tactics within a conditional strategy where the fitness pay-offs depend on an individual's competitive ability or status. Individuals are proposed as "choosing" the tactic that maximizes their fitness, giv
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18. Cooperation and self-interest: Pareto-inefficiency of Nash equilibria in finite random games
The relative merits of cooperation and self-interest in an ensemble of strategic interactions can be investigated by using finite random games. In finite random games, finitely many players have finite numbers of actions and independently and identically distributed (iid) random payoffs with continuous distribution functions. In each realization, player
The National Academy of Sciences.
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19. Strength determines coalitional strategies in humans
Coalitions enhance survival and reproductive success in many social species, yet they generate contradictory impulses. Whereas a coalition increases the probability of successfully obtaining rewards for its members, it typically requires a division of rewards among members, thereby diminishing individual benefits. Non-human primate data indicate that coaliti
The Royal Society.
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20. Game theory and reciprocity in some extensive form experimental games
We examine decision making in two-person extensive form game trees using nine treatments that vary matching protocol, payoffs, and payoff information. Our objective is to establish replicable principles of cooperative versus noncooperative behavior that involve the use of signaling, reciprocity, and backward induction strategies, depending on the availa
The National Academy of Sciences of the USA.
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21. Nas–Walras equilibria of a large economy
Individuals exchange contracts for the delivery of commodities in competitive markets and, simultaneously, act strategically; actions affect utilities across individuals directly or through the payoffs of contracts. This encompasses economies with asymmetric information. Nash–Walras equilibria exist for large economies, even if utility functions are not qu
The National Academy of Sciences.
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22. A dynamic model of social network formation
We consider a dynamic social network model in which agents play repeated games in pairings determined by a stochastically evolving social network. Individual agents begin to interact at random, with the interactions modeled as games. The game payoffs determine which interactions are reinforced, and the network structure emerges as a consequence of the d
The National Academy of Sciences.
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23. Nonmetric test of the minimax theory of two-person zerosum games.
As an experimental test of the minimax theory for two-person zerosum games, subjects played a game that was especially easy for them to understand and whose minimax-prescribed solution did not depend on quantitative assumptions about their utilities for money. Players' average relative frequencies for the moves and their proportions of wins were almost exact
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24. Dioecy and the evolution of sex ratios in ants
Split sex ratios, when some colonies produce only male and others only female reproductives, is a common feature of social insects, especially ants. The most widely accepted explanation for split sex ratios was proposed by Boomsma and Grafen, and is driven by conflicts of interest among colonies that vary in relatedness. The predictions of the Boomsma–Graf
The Royal Society.