Default Penalties
Mostrando 1-5 de 5 artigos, teses e dissertações.
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1. On Ponzi schemes in infinite horizon collateralized economies with default penalties
Araujo, Páscoa and Torres-Martínez (2002) showed that, without imposing any debt constraint, Ponzi schemes are ruled out in infinite horizon economies with limited commitment when collateral is the only mechanism that partially secures loans. Páscoa and Seghir (2009) presented two examples in which they argued that Ponzi schemes may reappear if, additiona
Escola de Pós-Graduação em Economia da FGV. Publicado em: 30/06/2011
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2. Endogenous debt constraints in collateralized economies with default penalties
In infinite horizon financial markets economies, competitive equilibria fail to exist if one does not impose restrictions on agents' trades that rule out Ponzi schemes. When there is limited commitment and collateral repossession is the unique default punishment, Araujo, Páscoa and Torres-Martínez (2002) proved that Ponzi schemes are ruled out without impo
Escola de Pós-Graduação em Economia da FGV. Publicado em: 30/06/2011
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3. Competitive equilibria in infinite-horizon collateralized economies with default penalties
Araújo, Páscoa and Torres-Martinez (2002) have shown that, without imposing either debt constraints or transversality conditions, Ponzi schemes are ruled out in infinite horizon economies with default when collateral is the only mechanism that partially secures loans. Páscoa and Seghir (2008) subsequently show that Ponzi schemes may reappear if, additiona
Publicado em: 16/03/2010
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4. Collateral, default penalties and almost finite-time solvency
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Fundação Getulio Vargas. Publicado em: 04/03/2008
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5. GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM EXISTENCE WITH ASSET-BACKED SECURITIZATION / EQUILÍBRIO GERAL E SECURITIZAÇÃO DE ATIVOS
We propose a specification of a general equilibrium model with securitization of collateral-backed promises and discuss the role of physical collateral to avoid, in equilibrium, pessimistic beliefs about the future rates of default. Promises are pooled in either pass-through securities or collateralized loans obligations (CLO), allowing the existence of diff
Publicado em: 2004