Uma teoria da verdade pragmatica : a quase-verdade de Newton C.A. da Costa

AUTOR(ES)
DATA DE PUBLICAÇÃO

2003

RESUMO

Alfred Tarki, in presenting his semantical conception of truth - a definition for formalized languages -, captured Aristotle s classical conception of truth - this one, a correspondencial truth conception. Mikenberg, da Costa and Chuaqui, introduced a formal conception of pragmatic truth - da Costa s quasi-truth -, based on the theories of truth of some pragmatists, such as C.S. Peirce, William James and John Dewey. The conception of quasi-truth is based on a kind of mathematical structure named, by da Costa, partial structure. We present the modal logical system QT - a kind of Ja´skowski s discussive logic -, associated to the logic QV (S5Q=). The logic QT constitutes an adequate formalization for the notion of quasi-truth. We introduce a Kripke model semantics for QT. We prove some metatheorems relative to the associated systems QT and QV. We define the notion of pragmatic sintactical consequence, present the pragmatic connectives and prove that QT is a paraconsistent logic. By using the mentioned metatheorems, we obtain a simplified proof of soundness and completeness of QT.

ASSUNTO(S)

partial structure quasi-truth theories of truth pragmatic truth paraconsistent logic discussive logic logica matematica não-classica ciencia verdade

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