Sobre a possibilidade de um conteúdo estreito numa teoria bi-dimensional epistêmica / The possibility of a narrow content in a two-dimensional epistemic theory

AUTOR(ES)
FONTE

IBICT - Instituto Brasileiro de Informação em Ciência e Tecnologia

DATA DE PUBLICAÇÃO

28/02/2012

RESUMO

The epistemic two-dimensionalism is the thesis that the mental states of a person have double division, possessing, therefore, a broad content and a narrow content. A broad content is the one whose determination depends partially on properties extrinsic to the individual: i.e., it is the one which is related to the world external to the individual, be it physical or social. On the other hand, the narrow content is the one completely determined by properties intrinsic to the individual, without the need of anything external. This narrow content is, according to Jacksons and Chalmers two-dimensionalism, the representative content of a mental state, presented through description of what the individual knows of and believes in the world around him. The objective of this dissertation dealing with this form of two-dimensionalism is to present it as a possible answer to two problems generated by the externalist affirmative that proper names and natural kind terms are rigid designators and the affirmative that all content in a mental state is broad. These two problems are the incompatibility of the broad content and the privileged access and its incompatibility with the explanatory role that intentional mental states seem to have regarding a persons behavior, for if people have no privileged access to the content of their mental states, such broad content cannot be seen as being causally relevant to their behaviors. However, the arguments presented by semantic externalism still seem too convincing to consider such consequences as being enough reason to all-together abandon the externalist thesis. Besides, a number of examples of languages functioning (as the use of proper names and natural kind terms) seem to point to the fact that semantic externalism is correct. Therefore, in this work, I shall analyze the two-dimensional theory under the light of externalist affirmatives on the meaning and on the individuation of the content of mental states, i.e., as being a thesis that not only is able to provide a viable answer to these two problems, but also is compatible with broad content as regarded by externalism.

ASSUNTO(S)

epistemic two-dimensionalism narrow content broad content externalism bi-dimensionalismo epistêmico conteúdo estreito conteúdo amplo externalismo filosofia filosofia

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