PUBLIC AND PRIVATE ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT FOR CARTELS: SHOULD THERE BE A COMMON APPROACH TO SANCTIONING BASED ON THE OVERCHARGE RATE?
AUTOR(ES)
Katsoulacos, Yannis
FONTE
Rev. econ. contemp.
DATA DE PUBLICAÇÃO
29/07/2019
RESUMO
RESUMO Analisamos a literatura teórica recente que aponta para a ineficácia, em termos de impacto no bem-estar, dos regimes de sanção atualmente aplicados aos cartéis pelas Autoridades de Concorrência (ACs). Em seguida, fornecemos uma comparação dos regimes levando em conta critérios relacionados à facilidade de implementação e transparência. Argumentamos a favor da mudança para um regime de penalidade, no qual a base de penalidade continua a ser a atual penalidade dominante da receita do cartel, mas em que, diferentemente da prática atual, a penalidade é baseada na taxa comumente estimada para calcular os danos em sinistros de danos privados, isto é, a taxa de sobretaxa.ABSTRACT We review recent theoretical literature pointing to the ineffectiveness, in terms of welfare impact, of currently applied sanctioning regimes for cartels by Competition Authorities (CAs). We then provide a comparison of the regimes taking also into account criteria related to ease of implementation and transparency. We argue the case for switching to a penalty regime, in which the penalty base continues to be the currently dominant penalty base of cartel revenue but in which, in contrast to current practice, the penalty rate is based on the rate commonly estimated in order to calculate damages in private damage claims, that is, the overcharge rate.
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