Processo orçamentário e comportamento Legislativo: emendas individuais, apoio ao Executivo e programas de governo

AUTOR(ES)

Limongi, Fernando, Figueiredo, Argelina

FONTE

Dados

DATA DE PUBLICAÇÃO

2005-12

RESUMO

The article challenges the contention that individual amendments are crucial for a system of exchanging favors with the Administration by members of Congress interested in distributive policies as a way of guaranteeing their reelection. By analyzing funds allocated through Congressional amendments, their distribution in different government programs, and roll-call votes in the Brazilian House of Representatives from 1996 to 2001, the authors show that: individual amendments are not prioritized either by Congress in the budget's approval or by the Administration in its implementation; there are no differences between the agenda dictated by the Administration and that of the legislators; and party affiliation explains both House floor votes and the implementation of individual amendments and is thus an explanatory variable in the Executive-Legislative relationship.

Documentos Relacionados

• COOPERAÇÃO, COMPETIÇÃO E O PROCESSO LEGISLATIVO: SOBRE A PROIBIÇÃO DAS FACÇÕES EM ROUSSEAU*
• Teatro legislativo: aspectos teatrais, políticos e jurídicos
• Saúde no poder legislativo: objeto, investigação e tendências
• Rotas de ingresso, trajetórias e acesso das mulheres ao legislativo: um estudo comparado entre Brasil e Argentina
• Interações entre os poderes executivo e legislativo no processo decisório: avaliando sucesso e fracasso presidencial