Innatismo y control genético
AUTOR(ES)
Barberis, Sergio Daniel
FONTE
Manuscrito
DATA DE PUBLICAÇÃO
2013-12
RESUMO
The aim of the present paper is to defend a partial reductionist explication of the concept of innateness in cognitive science. Firstly, I specify a set of minimal conditions for the analysis of the innateness concept. Secondly, I present the main proposals in dispute, namely, the reductionist, autonomist and skeptical accounts of innateness. After criticizing both skeptical and autonomist positions, I develop a partial account of innateness as genetic control, showing how that concept from developmental biology could be used to explicate innateness in cognitive science. Finally, I mention some philosophical advantages of my proposal.
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