Incentivos e constrangimentos à cooperação em arranjos organizacionais de combate à violência em Salvador.

AUTOR(ES)
DATA DE PUBLICAÇÃO

2005

RESUMO

Increasing levels of violence, in particular in large urban centers, have led the government and society to elaborate proposals to combat its main causes and consequences. These proposals are based on multisectorial organizational arrangements as a way to address solutions to the multiple causes of violence. These proposals are based on collective actions and on the cooperation of individuals and organizations. These proposals, however, are likely to treat cooperation as dependent only upon the will of individuals, not taking into account individuals rational choices of defection, free riding and of opportunistic behavior. Hence, proposals addressing solutions to violence bring to the core of the debate the issue of cooperation in a collective action setting. The discussion above has guided this researchs central question: why do individuals cooperate or do not cooperate in collective actions to combat the causes and the consequences of violence in the city of Salvador? Answers to this question are provided by comparing two cases: the Fórum Comunitário de Combate à Violência em Salvador, a non-governmental organization, and the Plano Intersetorial Modular de Ação para a Promoção da Paz e Qualidade de Vida na Cidade do Salvador, an operational plan under the coordination of Salvadors local government. The researchs objective is to bring evidence to illuminate the reasons why individuals cooperate or not when a collective action is required. In doing so, the research aims to single out the incentives and constraints on cooperation among individuals when they pursue collective actions against violence within two different institutional arrangements created to address the heightening of violence in Salvador. In answering the researchs question this study has been guided by the theoretical contributions of Ostrom (1990, 1999) and Levi (1991, 1997) which have also guided the researchs analytical framework. Hence, rational choice theory and empirical evidence collected in semi-structured interviews with key actors and in secondary sources of information have provided the theoretical and the empirical grounds to sustain the researchs main argument, namely that cooperation requires overcoming rational actors initial inertia towards collective action and that overcoming the constraints posed to collective action is likely to be minimized when actors take the initiative to create and to rule about a collective action organization. Furthermore, cooperative collective actions are constrained or stimulated by the dynamics and the nature of the decision-making process and by the existence of general and selective incentives.

ASSUNTO(S)

ação coletiva collective action violence combat administracao publica salvador cooperation cooperação combate à violência salvador

ACESSO AO ARTIGO

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