Da ética do indizível à função do silêncio no tractatus logico-philosophicus de Wittgenstein

AUTOR(ES)
DATA DE PUBLICAÇÃO

2007

RESUMO

The current presentation analyzes the sense in which Wittgenstein invites us to the silence from his last aphorism in Tractactus logico-philophicus 1921, which has oriented this work: " Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent. " Observe oneselt that the silence occupies a place of identity, that is, It will be necessary to keep itselt, protect itselt, because it is from silence to Wittgenstein, that it will be possible to find the clarity that is sought over the bad use of the language. The silence is, therefore, the hiatus between what is said and what is unsaid, in it are the conditions of the possibility to a comprehension from that is still to be said, but it can only be shown. Paradoxically, to Wittgenstein once more the silence represents the attitude, because to him, the meaning of life could not be enough or logically explained through the logic systems. According to Wittgenstein is thesis, there is a limit for the language that is, our language is insuffcient and therefore, it would be necessary to turn to the instances, like the ethic, the esthetic and the mystic. The philosopher would be a type of a silence keeper of the limit of utterable, so, the silence is be like a strategy of the quietness to the essencially ineffable. This analysis allows to conclude that, this double silence statute is the condition a priori to stabilish the sense between the said and the unsaid. The interdict

ASSUNTO(S)

wittgenstein ética silêncio linguagem filosofia wittgenstein ethics language silence

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