A MEMORY-BASED ARGUMENT FOR NON-REDUCTIONISM ABOUT THE TRANSTEMPORAL IDENTITY OF PERSONS

AUTOR(ES)

INAN, DANIEL

FONTE

Manuscrito

DATA DE PUBLICAÇÃO

2022

RESUMO

Abstract Does memory constitue diachronic identity? Or does it presuppose it? Butler has claimed that it is the latter, and, in this paper, I will side with him. My argumentation, however, will take a different route. My claim is not that memory presupposes transtemporal identity because I can only remember episodes that have happened to me. Rather, I will probe the idea that some properties of episodic remembering may be such that accounting for them requires us to posit a subject the transtemporal identity of which can't be reduced to continuity. These properties are the pastness of the recollected episode coupled with its first-personal accessibility. The argument will make heavy use of the experience of temporality.

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