Non-emptiness of the alpha-core
| Autor Principal: | Martins-da-Rocha, Victor Filipe |
|---|---|
| Outros Autores: | Yannelis, Nicholas C. |
| Tipo: | Technical Report |
| Idioma: | en_US |
| Publicado em: | Escola de Pós-Graduação em Economia da FGV 20110506 |
| Assuntos: | |
| Link Texto Completo: |
http://hdl.handle.net/10438/8024 |
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| We prove non-emptiness of the alpha-core for balanced games with non-ordered preferences, extending and generalizing in several aspects the results of Scarf (1971), Border (1984), Florenzano (1989), Yannelis (1991) and Kajii (1992).In particular we answer an open question in Kajii (1992) regarding the applicability of the non-emptiness results to models with infinite dimensional strategy spaces.We provide two models with Knightian and voting preferences for which the results of Scarf (1971) and Kajii (1992) cannot be applied while our non-emptiness result applies. |
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